夏炜, 吕林, 刘沛清. 直购电交易中等效电能双边定价博弈研究[J]. 现代电力, 2015, 32(3): 71-75.
引用本文: 夏炜, 吕林, 刘沛清. 直购电交易中等效电能双边定价博弈研究[J]. 现代电力, 2015, 32(3): 71-75.
XIA Wei, LYU Lin, LIU Peiqing. Economic Game Theory Research on Bilateral Electricity Pricing in Direct Power Purchase[J]. Modern Electric Power, 2015, 32(3): 71-75.
Citation: XIA Wei, LYU Lin, LIU Peiqing. Economic Game Theory Research on Bilateral Electricity Pricing in Direct Power Purchase[J]. Modern Electric Power, 2015, 32(3): 71-75.

直购电交易中等效电能双边定价博弈研究

Economic Game Theory Research on Bilateral Electricity Pricing in Direct Power Purchase

  • 摘要: 大用户向发电企业直接购电交易中,电费及大用户产品等效价格的制定共同影响各方收益。为找寻最合适的定价状态,提出将直接交易电价和产品等效电价作为发电企业和用户的决策变量,基于博弈论的思想建立了以系统各参与者收益达到最优均衡状态为目标的完全信息非合作的双层规划模型;并在该双层模型基础上构建了以系统最优为目标的全局优化模型。仿真结果表明,在直购电交易过程中,各参与者满足理性经济人假设时,所得Stackelberg均衡解更适合主导方发电厂的发展需要,市场呈现出更强的稳定性与可持续性。

     

    Abstract: The electricity pricing and the products price for large customers both affect the benefits of all participants in the course of the direct power purchase. In order to find the best pricing status, the electricity pricing and the products price are considered as the decision-making variables for the generation company and the large customers. The complete information non-cooperation bi-level programming model is built to achieve the equilibrium of all participants in the system based on game theory, and the Pareto model based on the two-layer model is built. Simulation result shows that the balancing solution of Stackelberg optimization method is better than that of the Pareto optimization method with much more stability and sustainability when all participants are rational agents in the course of the direct power purchase.

     

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