陈坤, 盛裕杰, 李涛, 许苑, 夏天, 段丽娟, 郭庆来. 计及用户决策的异质性与不完全理性的电网−充电运营商协同运行[J]. 现代电力, 2023, 40(3): 332-341. DOI: 10.19725/j.cnki.1007-2322.2021.0313
引用本文: 陈坤, 盛裕杰, 李涛, 许苑, 夏天, 段丽娟, 郭庆来. 计及用户决策的异质性与不完全理性的电网−充电运营商协同运行[J]. 现代电力, 2023, 40(3): 332-341. DOI: 10.19725/j.cnki.1007-2322.2021.0313
CHEN Kun, SHENG Yujie, LI Tao, XU Yuan, XIA Tian, DUAN Lijuan, GUO Qinglai. Power Network-charging Station Operator Coordinated Operation Considering Heterogeneity and Incomplete Rationality of User Decision-making[J]. Modern Electric Power, 2023, 40(3): 332-341. DOI: 10.19725/j.cnki.1007-2322.2021.0313
Citation: CHEN Kun, SHENG Yujie, LI Tao, XU Yuan, XIA Tian, DUAN Lijuan, GUO Qinglai. Power Network-charging Station Operator Coordinated Operation Considering Heterogeneity and Incomplete Rationality of User Decision-making[J]. Modern Electric Power, 2023, 40(3): 332-341. DOI: 10.19725/j.cnki.1007-2322.2021.0313

计及用户决策的异质性与不完全理性的电网−充电运营商协同运行

Power Network-charging Station Operator Coordinated Operation Considering Heterogeneity and Incomplete Rationality of User Decision-making

  • 摘要: 随着电动汽车和快速充电站的快速发展,电力网络与交通网络之间的耦合日渐增强。作为激励信号,充电价格是引导车辆用户的路径与充电选择的有效手段。为挖掘电动汽车充电负荷的空间灵活性,提出一种电网−充电运营商协同优化架构。首先,基于离散选择模型,对电力−交通融合网络进行建模,完成计及用户决策的异质性与不完全理性的充电负荷计算。之后,通过电网调度与充电运营商的合作,实现充电价格与充电容量的协同优化,对车辆用户的行为模式进行引导,以发掘电动汽车充电负荷的空间可平移潜力。最后,计及充电运营商在合作中的收益损失,基于纳什谈判机制对合作中产生的净收益进行合理分配。算例表明,所提协同运行架构有效地降低了电网的供电成本,同时从个体理性角度保证了合作联盟的稳定性。

     

    Abstract: Along with rapid growth of the electric vehicles(abbr. EV) and the fast charging station, the coupling between power network and transportation network is increasing. Charging price, as an incentive means, is an effective measure to guide the routing and charging choices of EV. To dig the spatial flexibility of electric vehicle charging loads, a coordinated optimization framework of power system vs. charging station operator was proposed. Firstly, the modeling of coupled power-transportation network was based on the discrete choice model to fulfill the charging load calculation considering the heterogeneity and incomplete rationality of vehicle driver's decision-making. Secondly, by means of the cooperation between power system operator and charging station operator, the charging price and charging capacity were coordinately optimized, and the behavior pattern of vehicle drivers was guided to dig the spatial transfer potential of charging loads. Finally, considering the income loss of charging station operators from the cooperation, the net income generated by cooperation was reasonably distributed based on the Nash bargaining mechanism. Results of computing example show that the proposed framework effectively reduces the power supply cost of power system and ensures the stability of cooperative alliance from the perspective of individual rationality.

     

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