XUE Jiacheng, TANG Zhong, SHENG Rui, ZHAO Lingguang, XIE Linyu. New energy consumption model based on stackelberg game under the background of electricity market[J]. Modern Electric Power, 2020, 37(3): 270-276. DOI: 10.19725/j.cnki.1007-2322.2019.0572
Citation: XUE Jiacheng, TANG Zhong, SHENG Rui, ZHAO Lingguang, XIE Linyu. New energy consumption model based on stackelberg game under the background of electricity market[J]. Modern Electric Power, 2020, 37(3): 270-276. DOI: 10.19725/j.cnki.1007-2322.2019.0572

New energy consumption model based on stackelberg game under the background of electricity market

  • It is an important issue in the research on new energy consumption that the minimized electricity purchasing cost of power grid is contradictory to the maximized revenue of power producers. To search the equilibrium solution for this issue, a new energy consumption model based on Stackelberg game under the electricity market was put forward. Firstly, according to the theory of one-leader and multi-follower Stackelberg game, regarding the power grid as the game-agent and leading in the penalty cost of new energy composition, the solution of wind and solar energy curtailment was taken as the objective under the lowest total electricity purchasing cost, hereafter, regarding the power producers as the follower of the game and taking the revenue of electricity selling as the objective, a one-leader and multi-follower Stackelberg game model for electricity market was constructed. Finally, utilizing the algorithm combining the improved self-adaptive genetic algorithm with particle swarm optimization algorithm, the Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium solution of above-mentioned model was obtained by the combined algorithm. Simulation results show that using the proposed model the benefits can be optimally distributed among all participants of the game, and the wind and solar energy curtailment can be well solved.
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