Research on the Evolutionary Game of Governments and Enterprises in Low-carbon Power Supply Side Under the Dynamic Reward-penalty Mechanism

Based on consumer behavior theory and evolutionary game, taking consumer utility function, profit function of power generating enterprises, power generation company profit function and carbon emission reduction as constraints, a consumer utility function was constructed. The impacts of consumer's preference, the product network externality, the reward and punishment mechanism of local government, the regulatory cost and the central government restraint mechanism on evolutionary stability strategy were mainly analyzed, and a fixed-effect model was constructed to carry out empirical analysis on the conclusion. Results of the analysis showed that under static reward-penalty mechanism there was no stable strategy of evolutionary; under the dynamic reward-penalty mechanism the evolutionary trajectory of local government and power generating enterprises was constantly and spirally propelled around the unique equilibrium strategy. The probability of strict supervision of local government was positively correlated with consumer’s low-carbon preference, the cost of undemanding supervision and the constraint strength of central government were negatively correlated with consumer’s high-carbon preference, product network externality, the lower limit of the punish and the cost of strict supervision. The lower limit of punishment, the cost of undemanding supervision and the constraint strength of central government played positive role in promoting low-carbon production of enterprises, and strict regulation of cost played a negative role in carbon emission reduction of power generating enterprises.