BAI Xin, XUE Chen, ZHANG Li, ZHANG Suibin, LI Guanghui, WANG Qingdong. Design of Power Price and Revenue Analysis for Ancillary Service Market Incentive in Response to Dispatching Control Demand[J]. Modern Electric Power, 2024, 41(3): 528-538. DOI: 10.19725/j.cnki.1007-2322.2022.0220
Citation: BAI Xin, XUE Chen, ZHANG Li, ZHANG Suibin, LI Guanghui, WANG Qingdong. Design of Power Price and Revenue Analysis for Ancillary Service Market Incentive in Response to Dispatching Control Demand[J]. Modern Electric Power, 2024, 41(3): 528-538. DOI: 10.19725/j.cnki.1007-2322.2022.0220

Design of Power Price and Revenue Analysis for Ancillary Service Market Incentive in Response to Dispatching Control Demand

  • The new power system under the goal of "carbon peaking, carbon neutralization" needs more flexible resources that can be dispatched to maintain the balance between supply and demand of the power grid. Therefore, first of all, in combination with the auxiliary service market, it is proposed that the agency should indirectly participate in the provincial auxiliary service market on behalf of power users, and design the elastic electricity price by coupling the balance demand of the power grid. Secondly, combined with the time of use price, a compensation settlement price is proposed to track the supply and demand relationship. Finally, a benefit model is designed for all day electricity users to participate in provincial ancillary service market transactions. Through the quantitative verification and analysis of the proposed method and model, it is concluded that the designed price model can track the change of power grid demand, adjust the actual settlement price, and provide market incentives for load side power users to participate in the transaction.
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