基于非对称纳什议价博弈的独立储能电量保险服务模型

An Independent Energy Storage Electricity Insurance Service Model Based on Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Game

  • 摘要: 为促进独立储能(independent energy storage, IES)参与电力市场,基于“收益堆叠”的思想,提出IES在电能量市场套利同时向微电网运营商、风力发电商等市场参与者出售电量保险服务的新商业模式,建立基于非对称纳什议价博弈的IES电量保险服务模型。首先,分别建立新商业模式下IES、风力发电商和微电网运营商的电量保险服务模型,以增加IES的收益流、降低风力发电商和微电网运营商的偏差惩罚成本。然后,采用非对称纳什议价博弈为IES的电量保险服务定价,将不考虑电量保险服务的传统商业模式下IES、风力发电商和微电网运营商的收益作为谈判破裂点,保证电量保险服务的可行性,并基于交易的保险电量量化各主体的议价能力,激发各主体参与电量保险服务的积极性。最后,通过算例验证模型的有效性。

     

    Abstract: To promote the participation of Independent Energy Storage (IES) in the electricity market, we put forward a new business model grounded in the idea of "revenue stacking". This model enalbes IES to engage in arbitrage within the electricity market and offer electricity insurance service to microgrid operators, wind power generators and other market participants. Additionally, an asymmetric Nash bargaining game-based model is established for IES electricity insurance service. First, under the new business model, the electricity insurance service models of IES, wind power producers and microgrid operators, are established aiming to increase the revenue stream of IES while reducing the deviation penalty cost of wind power producers and microgrid operators. Subsequently, the asymmetric Nash bargaining game is employed to determine the price of the electricity insurance service of IES. The revenues of IES, wind power producers and microgrid operators under the traditional business model are taken as the negotiation benchmark to ensure the feasibility of the electricity insurance service, which does not take into accout the power insurance service. Moreover, the bargaining power of each subject based on the traded insured power is quantified to stimulate the motivation of the subjects to participate in the electricity insurance service. Finally, the validity of the model is verified through examples.

     

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