于仲安, 叶康, 邵昊晖. 基于混合博弈和充电桩共享的社区−园区微电网与电动汽车协调优化调度[J]. 现代电力. DOI: 10.19725/j.cnki.1007-2322.2023.0165
引用本文: 于仲安, 叶康, 邵昊晖. 基于混合博弈和充电桩共享的社区−园区微电网与电动汽车协调优化调度[J]. 现代电力. DOI: 10.19725/j.cnki.1007-2322.2023.0165
YU Zhongan, YE Kang, SHAO Haohui. Coordinated Optimal Dispatching of Community-park Microgrid and Electric Vehicles Based on Mixed Game and Charging Pile Sharing[J]. Modern Electric Power. DOI: 10.19725/j.cnki.1007-2322.2023.0165
Citation: YU Zhongan, YE Kang, SHAO Haohui. Coordinated Optimal Dispatching of Community-park Microgrid and Electric Vehicles Based on Mixed Game and Charging Pile Sharing[J]. Modern Electric Power. DOI: 10.19725/j.cnki.1007-2322.2023.0165

基于混合博弈和充电桩共享的社区−园区微电网与电动汽车协调优化调度

Coordinated Optimal Dispatching of Community-park Microgrid and Electric Vehicles Based on Mixed Game and Charging Pile Sharing

  • 摘要: 针对含有电动汽车(electric vehicles,EV)的邻近社区、园区微电网(microgrids,MG)组成的多微电网系统,为了解决经济性和车多桩少问题,首先提出两阶段混合博弈模型。阶段1为上层以MG联盟为领导者、下层以EV聚合商(EVA)为跟随者双层主从博弈模型,以实现多主体利益共赢;阶段2为MG间纳什议价合作博弈,以实现合作收益公平分配。其次,提出中立型、激进型充电桩共享模式解决车多桩少问题。最后,提出综合指标贡献度,定量分析混合博弈结合各充电桩共享模式权衡解决问题潜力。仿真算例表明,混合博弈模型兼顾了MG联盟和EVA利益,减少了联盟成员运行成本;混合博弈结合中立型2和激进型5共享模式接纳更多EV充电,且对各主体利益损害较小,具有较高综合指标贡献度,在权衡解决经济性和车多桩少问题上具有较大潜力。

     

    Abstract: In this paper, we aim to address the challenge of balancing economic efficiency and the problem of fewer piles for more vehicles in the multi-microgrid system composed of neighboring community microgrids (MG) and park MG with electric vehicles (EV). Firstly, a two-stage mixed game model was proposed. At Stage 1, a two-layer master-slave game model with MG alliance as the leader in upper layer and EV aggregators (EVA) as the lower layer was developed to realize win-win results of multi-stakeholder. At Stage 2, a cooperative game of Nash negotiation theory between MG was utilized to ensure fair distribution of the cooperative income of alliance members. Secondly, the neutral and aggressive charging pile sharing modes were proposed to solve the problem of fewer piles for more vehicles .Finally, a comprehensive indicator contribution degree was proposed to quantitatively analyze the potential of the hybrid game combined with the sharing modes of various charging piles in balancing the issue. The simulation results indicate that the mix game model effectively incorporates the benefits of MG alliance and EVA, resulting in a reduction in the operating costs of MG alliance members. The proposed method of combining neutral type 2 and aggressive type 5 charging pile sharing modes in hybrid games facilitates more willing EV charging, does little damage to the interests of each stakeholder, yields a high comprehensive index contribution, and exhibits great potential in balancing and solving the problems of economy and fewer piles for more vehicles.

     

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